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showing that an attorney has regularly acted in another capacity for a
corporation. Finally, even though the modified subject matter test will
probably have its critics, this new test appears to effect a balance be-
tween the narrowness of the control group test and the expansiveness of
the traditional subject matter test on the issue of personification of the
corporation. In a confused field the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit has provided much needed clarity.
SHERI A. VAN GREENBY
Constitutional Law-Administrative Searches-Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc.: OSHA Needs a Warrant
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) inspectors have since
OSHA's passage seven years ago' entered and inspected the business
premises of thousands of employers to ascertain compliance with the
myriad of job safety standards promulgated by the Secretary of Labor.2
A great number of these inspections have been made pursuant to sec-
tion 8(a)3 of OSHA, which apparently authorized warrantless inspec-
1. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970), was
signed into law on December 29, 1970, and became effective April 28, 1971. Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 34, 84 Stat. 1590.
2. The stated congressional purpose behind OSHA was
[11o assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources-
3) by authorizing the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and
health standards applicable to business affecting interstate commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). The Secretary has used this authority to promulgate over 4,400 safety
standards. Brief for Appellee at 39, Marshall v. Barlow, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978) (citing R.
SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT. ITS GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 11
(1976)). Because the Act makes these standards applicable to business affecting interstate com-
merce, over four million business establishments are covered. Comment, OSHA: Employer
Beware, 10 Hous. L. REv. 426, 429 (1973).
3. Section 8(a) of OSHA provides:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon presenting
appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in charge, is authorized
1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment,
construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by
an employee of an employer, and
2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable
times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of em-
ployment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equip-
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tions.4 Before the enactment of OSHA the Supreme Court had held
that "except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a[n adminis-
trative inspection] .. , of private property without proper consent is
'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search war-
rant."5 The Court later held that the exceptional cases in which war-
rants are not needed include administrative inspections of certain
heavily regulated businesses. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,7 the Court
refused to extend this narrow exception to the warrant requirement,
and held that search warrants are required for OSHA inspections.8
OSHA authorities chose Barlow's, Incorporated for inspection
based on OSHA's standard selection process.' When the inspector ap-
peared the president of Barlow's refused to permit an inspection of the
employee area of the business because the inspector did not have a
warrant.10 The inspector returned three months later armed with a
court order compelling the president to submit to arr inspection.'1 Con-
ment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner,
operator, agent, or employee.
29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1970).
4. In some instances OSHA inspectors, rather than relying on their authority under § 8(a) to
make warrantless inspections, have nonetheless obtained a warrant before inspecting the particu-
lar premises. See, eg., Reynolds Metals Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Va.
1977); Lockport Non-Ferrous Casting, Inc. v. Marshall, 441 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Mar-
shall v. Reinhold Constr., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 685 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Morris v. United States Dep't
of Labor, 439 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (mem.); In re Northwest Airlines, Inc., 437 F. Supp.
533 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (mem.); Empire Steel Mfg. Co. v. Marshall, 437 F. Supp. 873 (D. Mont.
1977); Marshall v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., Fed. Malleable Div., 433 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Wis.
1977).
5. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). See also See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967).
6. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); accord, United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
7. 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
8. Id at 1820.
9. Id at 1819. OSHA determines which businesses to inspect based on a priority system.
First priority is given to businesses that have experienced a catastrophic accident. Next priority is
given to instances in which there have been employee complaints. Then come the "target indus-
tries" chosen because of a characteristically high incidence of injury in the industry. The lowest
priority is given to random inspections as in Barlow's. See D. PETERsoN, THE OSHA COMPLI-
ANCE MANuAL 13 (1975); Brief for National Federation of Independent Business as Amicus Cu-
riae at 14 n.2, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
10. 98 S. Ct. at 1819.
11. After the inspector was denied permission to inspect, OSHA regulations required him to
report this to his area director who was to "take appropriate action, including compulsory process,
if necessary." 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1977). Compulsory process has in the past taken one of two
forms: (1) a search warrant granted by a federal magistrate or judge, see, e.g., cases cited note 4
supra; or (2) an order compelling the businessman to submit to the inspection, see Usery v. Cen-
trif-Air Mach. Co., 424 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Dunlop v. Hertzler Enterprises, Inc., 418 F.
Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976) (three-judge panel) (mem.); Brennan v. Gibson Prods., Inc., 407 F.
Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976).(three-judge panel); Brennan v. Buckeye Indus., Inc., 374 F. Supp.
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sent was again refused and Barlow's brought an action to enjoin OSHA
from conducting warrantless inspections. 12 A three-judge court ruled
in Barlow's favor,' 3 holding that if consent to inspect is denied, the
fourth amendment requires OSHA inspectors to obtain a warrant and
that section 8(a) authorizing warrantless inspections is
unconstitutional. 14
Affirming the lower court's holding that warrantless OSHA inspec-
tions are unconstitutional, the Supreme Court reinforced its prior hold-
ings "that the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches protects against warrantless intrusions during civil as well as
criminal investigations"' 5 and "that this rule applies to commercial
premises as well as homes."16 Because "warrantless searches are gener-
ally unreasonable" a warrantless search would have to fit under a rec-
ognized exception.' 7 The Secretary argued that despite this rule the
warrantless OSHA inspection is reasonable and therefore an exception
to the warrant requirement rule. Specifically, the Secretary urged that
OSHA inspections are covered by the warrant requirement exception
applicable to pervasively regulated businesses. 8 The Court, however,
reasoned that this exception for inspections of certain heavily regulated
businesses is inapplicable because the degree of federal involvement in
OSHA-affected businesses does not rise to the level necessary to acti-
vate that exception.' 9 According to the Court, federal imposition of
1350 (S.D. Ga. 1974). It is the latter type of compulsory process that the OSHA inspectors
presented on their second visit.
In prior cases in which OSHA had sought orders to compel, OSHA had made no effort to
establish administrative probable cause, (for discussion of administrative probable cause, see notes
24 & 25 and accompanying text infra), but had merely cited the provisions of§ 8(a) as evidencing
their authority to inspect. See, e.g., 418 F. Supp. at 629 n.3. The Court in Barlow's indicated that
the order to compel an inspection may be the "functional equivalent of a warrant" if the fourth
amendment is satisfied by a showing of administrative probable cause. 98 S. Ct. at 1827 n.23.
12. 98 S. Ct. at 1819.
13. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976) (three-judge panel), af'dasub
noa. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 1816 (1978).
14. The lower court entered an injunction prohibiting any OSHA searches under § 8(a). Jus-
tice Rehnquist stayed that order pending appeal except as it applied to Barlow's. Jurisdictional
Statement at 37.
15. 98 S. Ct. at 1820. The Secretary had argued that Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), were distinguishable from Barlow'p
because the municipal housing codes involved in Camara and See, unlike OSHA, provided for
fines for refusal to consent to an inspection. Brief for Appellant at 14. The holding in Barlow'r
would seem to indicate that it is not the punitive nature of a fine or sanction but the invasion of
privacy interests occasioned by the inspection that is determinative.
16. 98 S. Ct. at 1820.
17. Id
18. Id
19. OSHA covers all businesses affecting interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1970).
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minimum wages and maximum hours does not constitute sufficient reg-
ulation to find implied consent to detailed OSHA inspections.20
The Secretary also contended that the warrantless inspection was
reasonable, and therefore in compliance with the fourth amendment,2"
because OSHA enforcement depends upon warrantless inspections and
because the restrictions on agency discretion in the Act protected pri-
vacy as much as a warrant would. The Court found, however, that
contrary to the Secretary's assertions, warrantless inspections are not
essential to the proper enforcement of OSHA,22 and the incremental
protections of the employer's privacy afforded by a warrant are not "so
marginal that [the protections] fail to justify the administrative burden
that may be entailed."'2
The cases in which the Court had previously found exceptions to the warrant requirement rule for
administrative inspections involved a federally licensed retail liquor dealer, Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), and a federally licensed firearms dealer, United States
v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). Barlow's held that whereas a liquor or firearms dealer, by engag-
ing in a regulated business, "has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of govern-
mental regulation," 98 S. Ct. at 1821, all businesses involved in interstate commerce are not
regulated so heavily that engaging in them would constitute implied consent to later searches.
20. 98 S. Ct. at 1821. The Court's discussion of the point indicates that the level of govern-
ment intrusion impliedly consented to by a certain business corresponds to that level of federal
regulation covering the business. Conceivably, the Court could find that the relatively minor min-
imum wage regulations would support implied consent to some lesser intrusions. See note 86
infra.
The Court also rejected the argument that because work areas are open to employees these
areas should be open to inspectors. 98 S. Ct. at 1821-22. If, on the other hand, the area to be
inspected is open, not only to employees, but to the general public as well, then the inspector does
not need a warrant. See, e.g., Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861
(1974).
21. 98 S. Ct. at 1822. Although the Court discussed the Secretary's two contentions in differ-
ent parts of the opinion, both contentions are basically that the warrantless OSHA inspection is
reasonable. The first contention, that OSHA inspections come within those cases allowing war-
rantless inspections of heavily regulated businesses, is termed by the Court "an exception from the
search warrant requirement." Id at 1820. The finding, however, of such an exception to the rule
that warrantless searches are generally unreasonable is tantamont to finding a reasonable search.
Indeed, the cases recognizing this exception speak in terms of the reasonableness of the search.
See, eg., Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75 (1970).
22. 98 S. Ct. at 1822. The Court based this determination on its belief that "the great major-
ity of businessmen can be expected in normal course to consent to inspection without warrant,"
id; its inference that because OSHA regulations provide for obtaining compulsory process if con-
sent is initially refused, the Secretary must have determined that such a procedure would not
cripple the Act's effectiveness, id at 1823-24; and its observation that if surprise is actually impera-
tive, then the desired result may be achieved by obtaining an ex parte warrant before seeking to
inspect, id at 1824. Justice Stevens, in dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, stated
that he "would defer to Congress' judgment regarding the importance of a warrantless search
power to the OSHA enforcement scheme." Id at 1829 (dissenting opinion).
23. Id at 1825. The Court concluded that a warrant would "provide assurances from a neu-
tral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is
pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria," id at 1826, and "advise
the owner of the scope and objects of the search, beyond which limits the inspector is not expected
to proceed," id Stevens! dissent urged that the first function would be served by the statute itself
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Although the Court found that OSHA inspections are not reason-
able absent a warrant, it also held that the showing necessary for the
issuance of an administrative warrant is not the same as "probable
cause in the criminal law sense."'24 The standard of "administrative
probable cause" may be met by
showing that a specific business has been chosen for an OSHA search
on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement of
the Act derived from neutral sources, such as, for example, disper-
sion of employees in various types of industries across a given area,
and the desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of
the area.25
Thus, the Court continued a middle of the road posture with respect to
administrative inspections by requiring a warrant, but one that could
be issued on a showing of administrative probable cause rather than
the more rigid standard of particularized probable cause.26
and pertinent regulations. Id at 1830 (dissenting opinion). It is inconsistent with traditional
fourth amendment analysis, however, to allow the searcher's own set of rules to substitute for the
determination of a neutral and detached magistrate. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948) (a warrant's "protection consists in requiring. . . a neutral and detached magistrate in-
stead of. . . the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"); Brief
for Appellee at 43. The Secretary urged, however, that, unlike police officers in the field, OSHA
field inspectors do not exercise discretion in determining which businesses to inspect; that decision
belongs to the area director. Therefore, a magistrate's warrant is not needed because the area
director serves as the neutral and detached decisionmaker. Brief for Appellant at 35, 44-45; cf. 37
CIN. L. REv. 243, 246-47 (1968) (distinguishing police searches from health inspections with simi-
lar discretion argument).
24. 98 S. Ct. at 1824. If criminal probable cause were required it would be necessary for
OSHA agents to demonstrate to a magistrate that they had probable cause to believe conditions
on the particular business premises to be searched were in violation of OSHA standards. This
standard can be termed particularized probable cause because it requires an assessment of a par-
ticular situation. It is this feature that distinguishes probable cause in the criminal law sense from
administrative probable cause.
25. Id at 1825. The fourth amendment comprises two different clauses: (I) the reasonable-
ness clause---"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated," and (2) the warrant
clause---"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. The clauses are interrelated by virtue of the general rule that searches made
pursuant to a valid warrant under the warrant clause are reasonable and thus not prohibited by
the reasonableness clause; searches made without a warrant are prohibited unless they fall within
an exceptional class of searches that are considered reasonable apart from any requirement of a
warrant. The Barlow'r majority found the OSHA inspection to be unreasonable and therefore
under the warrant requirement. The warrant they require, however, does not meet the probable
cause standard of the warrant clause. The dissenters correctly assert that the administrative stan-
dard of probable cause, based not on a particularized belief that there are violations on the prem-
ises, but on compliance with administrative selection procedures, is inconsistent with the warrant
clause. 98 S. Ct. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion accuses the majority of
acting inconsistently in using the lack of a warrant to find the search unreasonable but then only
requiring an administrative warrant based on less than particularized probable cause.
26. For definition of particularized probable cause, see note 24 supra.
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Prior to the birth of administrative probable cause in Camara v.
Municipal Court27 and See v. City of Seattle,2 the Supreme Court had
consistently held that the protections of the fourth amendment had no
application outside the criminal area.2 9 The reversal of this position
began in Camara in which the appellant was arrested and convicted
under a city ordinance for refusing to allow city housing inspectors to
inspect the portion of his leased premises that he used as a residence.
30
The Court held the fourth amendment warrant requirement applicable
to the administrative search contemplated by the municipal housing
code. 31 Yet, the Court realized that the criminal standard of particular-
ized probable cause was inappropriate for such compliance inspec-
tions.32 Instead, a new standard applicable to administrative
inspections was enunciated: "'[P]robable cause' to issue a warrant to
inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards
for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particu-
lar dwelling."
33
In See v. City of Seattle, the appellant was arrested and convicted
for refusing to allow city housing inspectors to inspect his commercial
warehouse. The Court held that "Camara applies to similar inspec-
tions of commercial structures which are not used as private resi-
dences."' The opinion, however, contained some dicta that was to
become the basis for later exceptions to the rule:
We do not in any way imply that business premises may not reason-
ably be inspected in many more situations than private homes, nor
do we question such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing pro-
grams which require inspections prior to operating a business or
27. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
28. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
29. See Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (per curiam) (equally divided Court let stand
decision by Ohio Supreme Court upholding conviction of defendant who refused to submit to
warrantless housing inspection); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (upholding defendant's
conviction on similar facts as Eaton but inspection was prompted by neighbor's complaint); f.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (fourth amendment protected defendant from seizure
of business invoices that could be used to establish violations of revenue laws because sanctions
involved were in substance criminal). For further background on application of the fourth
amendment in civil in contrast to criminal contexts, see generally Sonnenreich & Pinco, The In-
spector Knocks: Administrative Inspection Warrants Under an Expanded Fourth Amendment, 24
Sw. LJ. 418 (1970).
30. Id. at 525-27.
31. Id. at 534.
32. Id. at 536. This is true because "the agency's decision to conduct an area inspection is
unavoidably based on its appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole, not on its knowledge of
conditions in each particular building." Id
33. Id at 538.
34. Id at 542.
1979]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
marketing a product. Any constitutional challenge to such programs
can only be resolved, as many have in the past, on a case-by-case
basis under the general Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness.
35
Thus, the See holding was carefully limited to local housing code in-
spections and did not "consider the reach of the Fourth Amendment
with respect to various federal regulatory statutes.
36
The Court had its first opportunity to resolve a conflict between
the fourth amendment and a federal regulatory scheme in Colonnade
tatering Corp. v. United States.37 Colonnade had been licensed by the
State of New York to serve liquor and was subject to the federal retail
liquor dealer's tax.38 In the course of enforcing the latter regulation,
agents of the Internal Revenue Service3 9 requested permission to in-
spect a locked warehouse on Colonnade's premises. Permission was
refused by Colonnade's president on the ground that the agents did not
have a search warrant. Thereupon, the agents broke the lock and con-
fiscated a quantity of liquor.40 The Court held that the warrant re-
quirement of Camara and See was not applicable in this case, 41 basing
its holding on the long history of "close supervision and inspection" of
the liquor industry.42 The Court noted that warrantless liquor inspec-
tions date from pre-fourth amendment legislation.43 Moreover, this
special treatment of liquor inspections was predicated on a governmen-
tal property interest in untaxed liquor.44 The idea that an owner en-
gaging in a highly regulated business in effect consents to warrantless
inspections did not begin to appear until later cases.
This exception to Camara and See was broadened two years later
by United States v. Biswell.45 Biswell was a pawn shop operator feder-
35. Id at 545-46.
36. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 313 (1972).
37. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
38. Id at 72.
39. Agents of the Alcohol and Tobacco Division of the IRS have broad statutory authority to
enter and inspect the premises of retail liquor dealers; dealers who refuse such inspections can be
fined $500. Id at 73-74; see I.R.C. §§ 5146(b), 7342, 7606.
40. 397 U.S. at 73.
41. Id at 76. The precise holding in Colonnade was that Congress, although constitutionally
able, did not provide for warrantless inspections of liquor dealers but instead imposed a fine of
$500 on those who refused to submit to a warrantless inspection. The agents were required to
return the liquor, which was also barred from use as evidence.
42. Id at 77.
43. Id at 75.
44. Id at 76 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886)).
45. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
[Vol. 57
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ally licensed to deal in sporting weapons.46 A city policeman and a
federal Treasury agent seeking to ascertain compliance with federal
law asked to enter a locked storeroom on Biswell's premises. Biswell
unlocked the storeroom and allowed the inspectors to enter without a
warrant but only after being referred to the warrantless inspection pro-
vision in the Gun Control Act.4' The Court ultimately held that this
warrantless search provision fell within the Colonnade exception to
Camara and See."8 Because, however, "[flederal regulation of the in-
terstate traffic in firearms is not as deeply rooted in history as is govern-
mental control of the liquor industry,"49 the Court found it necessary to
augment its Colonnade reasoning with four inferred factors in order to
uphold the Biswell search: (1) Gun control is an important federal in-
terest and inspection is a crucial part of the regulatory scheme.5 (2)
The requirement of a warrant easily could frustrate this crucial inspec-
tion.1 (3) Protections afforded by a warrant would be negligible.52 (4)
The threat to privacy is limited since the dealer is already engaging in a
46. Id at 312.
47. Id The Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1976), authorizes federal agents
to enter the premises of any firearms or ammunition dealer to examine documents, firearms, or
ammunition. Id § 923(g).
48. 406 U.S. at 317. Whether the search was lawful depended on whether the warrantless
search provision of the Gun Control Act was constitutional and not on whether Biswell's consent
to the search was valid. If the warrantless search provision was unconstitutional, Biswell's con-
sent, given only after reading the provision, could not support the search. Cf Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (consent to search obtained after presentation of invalid warrant is
insufficient). And, if the warrantless search was constitutional, the lawfulness of the search did not
depend on consent. 406 U.S. at 315.
49. 406 U.S. at 315. It is also clear that the government had no property interest in weapons
as it did in untaxed liquor.
50. Id This factor is arguably present in the housing code situations of Camara and See.
51. Id at 316. The Court in Camara failed to discuss the possibility that a warrant require-
ment would frustrate housing code inspection programs except to say "lilt has nowhere been
urged that fire, health, and housing code inspection programs could not achieve their goals within
the confines of a reasonable search warrant requirement." 387 U.S. at 533. The Biswell Court,
however, found that gun control would be frustrated by a warrant requirement and distinguished
the housing code situation by observing that building code violations were "conditions that were
relatively difficult to conceal or to correct in a short time;" warrants could, therefore, be required
"with little if any threat to the effectiveness of the inspection system there at issue." 406 U.S. at
316. The Court was undoubtedly referring to its recommended procedure of first seeking consent
and then reappearing with a warrant after having alerted the building owner of an impending
inspection. See 387 U.S. at 539-40. The Court was concerned that the unannounced aspect of gun
control inspections, which they considered crucial, would be jeopardized by a warrant require-
ment. The opinion never addressed the possibility of obtaining an ex parte warrant before the
search.
52. 406 U.S. at 316. The Court did not elaborate on this factor except to indicate that if an
inspection under the Gun Control Act is to be effective it must be flexible with regard to time,
scope and frequency, and that any warrant that allowed this flexibility would not provide much
protection. Id
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pervasively regulated business. 53
Because Biswell represented an expansion of the Colonnade excep-
tion, the question arose whether the exception had replaced the
Camara-See warrant requirement.54 This uncertainty was resolved in
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States55 in which the Court reaffirmed the
Camara-See rule. In Almeida-Sanchez, petitioner's automobile had
been stopped and searched twenty-five miles from the Mexican border
by roving border patrol agents who had neither a warrant nor probable
cause for the search. 6 The search uncovered marijuana and led to pe-
titioner's conviction for illegal importation.5 ' The search was con-
ducted pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which
provided for warrantless searches of automobiles within a reasonable
distance from the border.5 8 Almeida-Sanchez challenged this provision
as a violation of the fourth amendment. The Government argued that
the warrantless search provision came within the Colonnade-Biswell ex-
ception to the warrant requirement rule.59 In holding the search un-
constitutional, the Court rejected the applicability of the Colonnade-
Biswell exception.6" Although there was a history of federal regulation
in the case,61 as there was in Colonnade and to a lesser extent in
53. Id This factor is the only one listed by the Bswell Court that was based on the
Colonnade rationale of a highly regulated business. The Biswell opinion, unlike Colonnade, hints
of an implied consent rationale. "When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated
business and to accept a federal license, he does so with the knowledge that his business records,
firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective inspection." Id
54. Cf. 98 S. Ct. at 1821 ("The clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated industry
of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswell is the exception. The Secretary would make it the
rule.")
55. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
56. Id at 267-68.
57. Id at 267.
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1976). The related regulation provides that a reasonable distance
is "within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States." 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2)
(1978).
Although the statute allows warrantless searches for illegal aliens, marijuana discovered
would be admissible if it was "in plain view" during a search for illegal aliens and provided that
such a search for aliens was constitutional. Cf. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968)
("objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence").
59. 413 U.S. at 270-71. The government did not attempt to justify the search as within the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement that allows warrantless searches of automobiles
if there is probable cause. Id at 269-70; see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Since
there was no probable cause in.41meida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 268, the automobile exception would
have been of no avail.
60. 413 U.S. at 271.
61. "Since 1875, Congress has given 'almost continuous attention.., to the problems of
immigration and of excludability of certain defined classes of aliens."' .d at 292 (White, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Kleindienst v. Maudel, 408 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1972)).
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Biswell, the Court distinguished those cases as involving implied con-
sent to search:
A central difference between those cases and this one is that
businessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enter-
prises as [alcohol and firearms] accept the burdens as well as the ben-
efits of their trade, whereas the petitioner here was not engaged in
any regulated or licensed business. The businessman in a regulated
industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.62
Unlike Almeida-Sanchez, the petitioner in Barlow's was engaged
in a regulated business. But the Court distinguished Barlow's from
Colonnade and Biswell on the grounds that the degree of business regu-
lation in Barlow's did not support implied consent to search as it did in
Colonnade and Biswell. Such an implied consent rationale, however, is
obviously a fiction and alone is an insufficient basis for applying the
Colonnade-Biswell exception.63 Indeed, the Court recognized a second
ground on which to distinguish Colonnade-Biswell-whereas liquor
and firearms regulatory programs would be frustrated by a warrant re-
62. 413 U.S. at 271. The Almeida-Sanchez dissent considered the Colonnade-Biswell excep-
tion broad enough to cover that case. The dissent argued that two of BiswelKr four factors, see text
accompanying notes 50-53 supra, would support a warrantless search. Specifically, the dissent
noted the important federal interest in immigration control, and the belief that roving patrol
searches were essential to the regulatory scheme, to support the warrantless search. 413 U.S. at
292-93 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent discussed the history of immigration regulation, not to
support an implied consent argument, but to bolster the finding that immigration control is an
important federal interest.
The position of Chief Justice Burger and Justice White in Barlow's, voting to require OSHA
to get a warrant, is clearly inconsistent with their dissenting posture in Almeida-Sanehez in which
Justice White argued that the roving border patrol warrantless search was sanctioned by Colon-
nade-Biswell. Id at 294. Moreover, Justice White, writing for the Barlow's majority, cited the
majority language in Akielda-Sanchez in order to distinguish Colonnade and Biswell. 98 S. Ct. at
1821. In the past both Justice White and Chief Justice Burger have been receptive to reasonable-
ness arguments as justifications for not requiring law enforcement officers to get warrants. It was,
however, their unwillingness to accept the reasonableness analysis of Justice Stevens that was
crucial to the outcome of Barlow'r. The inconsistency is perhaps explained by the different proba-
ble cause showing required for criminal as opposed to administrative searches. In the criminal
area, in which there is a rigid requirement of particularized probable cause, Chief Justice Burger
and Justice White may be more disposed to permit warrantless searches based upon a reasonable-
ness analysis than in the administrative area in which the probable cause requirement is less strin-
gent. This argument, however, does not adequately explain why Chief Justice Burger and Justice
White voted to allow warrantless roving border patrol searches in Almelda-Sanchez rather than
supporting Justice Powell's position requiring an administrative warrant. See 413 U.S. at 275
(Powell, J., concurring).
63. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, implied consent, taken to its logical extreme,
can be reduced to absurdity. Stevens observed that under an implied consent analysis it is only
those regulatory programs started long ago that will come under the Colonnade-Biswell exception.
98 S. Ct. at 1832-33 (dissenting opinion). A logical extension of the implied consent doctrine
would demand that if businessman A started his business before the regulations began he would
be protected from warrantless searches, while businessman B who began business after it was
subject to regulation could be said to have impliedly consented to a warrantless inspection
provision.
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quirement,64 the success of OSHA is not so dependent on a warrantless
inspection. In support of this conclusion, the Court reasoned that
OSHA would not be affected adversely by a warrant requirement be-
cause most businessmen would consent to warrantless OSHA
inspections.65
This reliance on the probability that businessmen will consent to
government intrusions is perhaps unsound in view of the inevitable
awareness that consent is not required. An additional distinction, not
emphasized by the Court, suggests more strongly that the success of
OSHA is not dependent on warrantless inspections: whereas no one
directly involved with an illegal liquor or firearms operation has any
interest in informing the government of the illegality, employees do
have significant interest in informing OSHA of safety violations.
Moreover, information concerning violations can be relayed anony-
mously.66 Employee complaints, therefore, provide an alternative en-
forcement opportunity available to OSHA regulators that was not
available in the liquor and firearms cases.
Thus, although the Barlow's opinion stressed the implied consent
rationale, the Court implies that the availability of alternative enforce-
ment opportunities is also a factor distinguishing the Barlow's warrant-
less inspection from those upheld under the Colonnade-Biswell
exception to the warrant requirement. Combining these two factors,
application of the Colonnade-Biswell exception appears subject to a
two-pronged requirement that there be (1) regulation of a business en-
terprise sufficient to support an implied consent to search theory67 and
(2) no alternative enforcement opportunity to a warrantless inspec-
tion.68 Since these requirements for the Colonnade-Biswell exception
64. Cf. Biswell v. United States, 406 U.S. at 316 (in context of gun control in which violations
are easily concealed, a warrant could frustrate deterrent effect of inspections).
65. See note 22 and accompanying text supra. The Court also noted that OSHA regulations
require agents to seek compulsory process if entry to inspect is denied rather than forcibly entering
the premises. This regulation, not required by the Act, is viewed by the Court as evidence that the
Secretary himself does not believe that warrantless, surprise inspections are necessary for OSHA's
effectiveness. 98 S. Ct. at 1823-24.
66. Furthermore, "[no person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any
employee because such employee has filed any complaint ... under or related to [OSHA]." 29
U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1970).
67. See, B/swell, and Almeida-Sanchez all mention federally licensed and regulated enter-
prises. It is likely, however, that a license requirement in a regulatory scheme will not alone
activate the Colonnade-Biswell exception. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 526
n.l (housing ordinance required each owner to obtain license renewable every year upon inspec-
tion). Thus, the amount of regulation and not the license requirement is determinative.
68. The unavailability of enforcement opportunities other than warrantless inspections is not
sufficient without the implied consent requirement to activate the Colonnade-B/swell exception. In
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were not satisfied, the Barlow's Court found that warrantless OSHA
inspections were unreasonable and therefore unconsitutional6 9
While Barlow's did find that warrantless OSHA inspections were
unconstitutional, the Court held that a warrant need not be supported
by a showing of particularized probable cause but only by a showing of
administrative probable cause.70 The dissenters in Camara and See, as
well as Justice Stevens in Barlow's, were correct in arguing that admin-
istrative probable cause is inconsistent with the literal language of the
fourth amendment warrant clause.7" Particularized probable cause,
however, is inappropriate in an OSHA context just as it was in the
housing code cases. Because the purpose of OSHA inspections is more
to encourage compliance with the safety regulations than to catch vio-
lations that are thought to exist,7 2 a decision to inspect is necessarily
based on criteria such as the safety record of an entire industry rather
than on knowledge of violations within particular business premises.
Thus, requiring a particularized probable cause standard would limit
OSHA inspections to those conducted pursuant to employee com-
plaints or after catastrophic accidents and thereby curtail OSHA's abil-
ity to encourage pre-accident compliance with safety regulations. If
compelled to require particularized probable cause and thus emascu-
Almelda-Sanchez, Justice White argued quite convincingly that warrantless roving border patrol
searches were essential to stop the flow of illegal immigrants, 413 U.S. at 293 (White, J., dissent-
ing), however, the Colonnade-Biswell exception was not applied because there was no business
regulation to support implied consent. See id at 271, quoted in text accompanying note 62 supra.
In some instances in which the implied consent argument is especially strong, due to specific
regulation in an unusually dangerous enterprise, implied consent alone may support the
Colonnade-Biswell exception, even though there are other enforcement opportunities available.
See text accompanying notes 79-83 infra.
69. Part I of the majority opinion in Barlow's deals with the applicability of the Colonnade-
Biswell exception to the warrant requirement rule, while part II deals with the determination of
the reasonableness of the warrantless inspection by balancing administrative necessities against
the incremental protection a warrant would provide. As noted above, note 21 supra, finding the
Colonnade-B/swell exception applicable constitutes a finding that the search is reasonable.
In the context of a fill scale intrusion into privacy such as an OSHA inspection, it is unlikely
that the balancing test discussed in part II would ever render a warrantless search reasonable.
This test does not consider the privacy expectations of the inspectee as does the Colonnade-Biswell
test, which contains the implied consent element. A balancing test is only appropriate in a situa-
tion in which there is a limited intrusion. Cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976) (routine warrantless stops for questioning at permanent border check points are constitu-
tional based on balancing of governmental interests and personal privacy interests, but intrusion
was "quite minimal"). Therefore, due to the inapplicability of a balancing test in a full scale
intrusion context, the entire reasonableness inquiry should be whether the Colonnade-Bsell ex-
ception is applicable. It is necessary, however, to borrow the "no other enforcement opportuni-
ties" factor from the balancing analysis in order to adequately distinquish Colonnade-Biswell from
Barlow's.
70. 98 S. Ct. at 1824.
71. See note 25 su.pra.
72. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970), quotedin note 2 supra.
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late OSHA, the Court would likely have found the inspections to be
reasonable and therefore not subject to any warrant requirement. Re-
quiring the administrative warrant instead is preferable because it does
provide the businessman protection from a vengeful regulator by re-
quiring that the decision to inspect be based on a rational administra-
tive selection process. 3 Such protection, while not as great as that
afforded by particularized probable cause, is better than no independ-
ent review of the inspection decision.
The ultimate impact of Barlow's on OSHA enforcement might de-
pend in part on the level of actual consent required to justify a consen-
sual administrative inspection.74 As noted earlier, the Barlow's
decision was based in part on the Court's belief that most employers
probably would consent to a warrantless inspection. How valid the
Court's guess is will depend to a significant extent on what level of
consent will be required. If a voluntariness test as found in the crimi-
nal context75 is required for consent to an administrative inspection,
arguably fewer businessmen will be held to have given their consent.
In the criminal context, knowledge of the right to withhold consent to
search, while not necessary, is a factor in determining the voluntariness
of the consent.76 For example, submitting to a search by a government
agent who announces "I am here to search your premises" has been
held not to constitute valid consent in a criminal case.77 Some lower
courts may be willing to apply a less rigid standard for administrative
inspections, just as the Camara Court lessened the probable cause
standard.78
73. For a detailed discussion by lower courts on the showing that would support an OSHA
warrant, see Reynolds Metals Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Va. 1977), and
Morris v. United States Dep't of Labor, 439 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. Ill. 1977).
74. Despite the vigorous arguments by the Secretary of Labor that a warrant requirement
would severely hamper OSHA enforcement, see Brief for Appellant at 44-45, George H. R. Tay-
lor, Director of the AFL-CIO's new Occupational Safety and Health Department (whose or-
ganization filed an amicus brief on behalf of appellant), stated that an amendment to a Small
Business Administration bill passed by the Senate "is a far worse threat than the Barlow'r deci-
sion." Bus. WEEK, Sept. 11, 1978, at 53. That amendment would exempt from OSHA regulations
businesses in low injury rate industries with 10 or fewer employees. Id
75. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent to criminal search requires
voluntariness based on consideration of totality of circumstances).
76. Id at 232-34.
77. Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (no valid consent when defendant acquiesced
in search by revenue officers who said they had come to search premises for violations of revenue
law).
78. In two OSHA cases, Lake Butler Apparel Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 519 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.
1975), and Stockwell Mfg. Co. v. Usery, 536 F.2d 1306 (10th Cir. 1976), lower courts found ade-
quate actual consent to inspection when inspectors merely showed their credentials and were then
allowed to search. The courts in these cases did not consider that the actual consent standard they
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Barlow's will also affect other federal regulatory statutes that pro-
vide for warrantless inspections but, unlike OSHA, are aimed at spe-
cific industries rather than all businesses affecting interstate commerce.
Soon after the Barlow's decision the Supreme Court vacated and re-
manded for reconsideration in light of the Barlow's decision a Sixth
Circuit case79 involving warrantless safety inspections under the Coal
Mine Safety and Health Act8 . Justice White suggested that these sin-
gle industry warrantless inspections might be constitutional "where
regulations [are] so pervasive that a Colonnade-Biswell exception to the
warrant requirement could apply."'" Even if a single industry inspec-
tion does not come under that exception, many of the statutes provide
for resort to federal court for an order to compel inspection rather than
allowing a forcible inspection.82 Once in court the agency could make
a showing of administrative probable cause and then be allowed to
search.83
Moreover, Barlow's will affect other federal regulatory inspections
that, like OSHA, are aimed at thousands of businesses in many unre-
lated industries. For example, the Supreme Court recently vacated and
remanded for reconsideration in light of Barlow's two Fifth Circuit
cases challenging the government's right to make warrantless inspec-
tions to check compliance with employment discrimination rules that
affect all businesses that contract with the federal government.84 Re-
applied was any different from that applied in criminal cases. An argument can be made, how-
ever, that the consent involved in these cases did not rise to the Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973), voluntariness requirements. Thus these holdings indicate a willingness to relax
actual consent standards in administrative searches.
79. Consolidation Coal Co. v. United States, 560 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1977), vacated and
remanded, 98 S. Ct. 2841 (1978) (mem.).
80. Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified as
amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
81. 98 S. Ct. at 1825. Despite this dicta Justice Stevens believed that the Barlow's decision
rendered inspection provisions in legislation directed at single industries presumptively invalid.
Id at 1834 n. 11 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
82. Id at 1825 nn.18 & 19.
83. OSHA regulations, but not the Act itself, required that inspectors seek compulsory proc-
ess if entry was refused. The issue in Barlow's was not whether an adequate showing had been
made in court to support the order compelling inspection, but whether any resort to judicial proc-
ess was needed given the Act's provision for warrantless inspections.
84. In United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated
and remanded mem., 98 S. Ct. 2841 (1978), and United States v. Mississippi Power & Light Co,
553 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded mem., 98 S. Ct. 2841 (1978), two utilities
questioned the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. § 339 (1964-1965 Compi-
lation), as amendedby Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. § 406 (1969), which prohibits employment
discrimination by government contractors. The constitutional challenge is based in part on a
fourth amendment violation in that the Order requires government contractors to permit access to
their books and records by government officials to determine compliance with the Order. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that public utilities come within the Colonnade-Bswell
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consideration of these cases will inevitably focus on two aspects of the
implied consent rationale not fully clarified in Barlow's.
First, because the defendants in these employment discrimination
cases are electric utility companies and therefore heavily regulated in
the rate-setting function of their business, the question arises whether
regulation of rates will support implied consent to inspections concern-
ing employment practices. Barlow's did not answer this question be-
cause no aspect of the business involved in that case was appreciably
regulated. In both Colonnade and Biswell the warrantless inspections
were directly related to the purposes behind the federal regulation con-
sidered crucial in upholding the inspections. Moreover, it would strain
the existing fiction of implied consent if regulation in one aspect of a
business could lead to implied consent to a search relating to another
aspect. It would seem, therefore, that regulation in one aspect of a
business cannot support consent to a search related to another aspect.
s5
A second aspect of the Barlow's implied consent rationale that
must be explored in the reconsideration of these employment discrimi-
nation cases is whether the electric utilities by contracting with the fed-
eral government to supply electricity have impliedly consented to
warrantless inspections in the same way that businessmen engaging in
certain federally regulated businesses have. If the warrantless inspec-
tion is related to the contract provisions, the business, by accepting the
benefits of the contract, might be said to accept the burden of warrant-
less inspection. In the electric utility cases, however, selling electricity
to the government has nothing to do with hiring practices. Therefore,
requiring these utilities, because they contract with the government, to
be subject to unrelated warrantless inspections of employment records
is inconsistent with the implied consent requirement behind the Colon-
nade-Biswell exception.
Even if the government is able to succeed on the implied consent
arguments,86 the second requirement of the Colonnade-Biswell test, that
exception, and therefore the warrantless search of employee records is not a fourth amendment
violation. 553 F.2d at 471.
w). in a lower court OSHA decision, a three-judge court refused to apply the Colonnade-
B/swell exception to allow a warrantless OSHA inspection of an employer who manufactured
ammunition, a business presumably regulated by the Gun Control Act. Dunlop v. Hertzler Enter-
prises, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.M. 1976) (three-judge panel). The court did not discuss
whether this particular manufacturer came under the provisions of the Gun Control Act, but a
manufacturer of ammunition is covered by the Act. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) (1976).
86. Some language in the Barlow's opinion arguably could support a finding ofimplied con-
sent in the employment discrimination cases. See 98 S. Ct. at 1821. A lesser intrusion of looking
through employment records (as opposed to detailed and minute OSHA inspections) might be
supported by a lesser amount of regulation or, conceivably, by pervasive regulation in other as-
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there be no alternative enforcement opportunities, should preclude the
application of the warrant requirement exception in the employment
discrimination context. The regulatory enforcement of employment
discrimination rules will not suffer appreciably due to a warrant re-
quirement because employees, just as they have an interest in reporting
safety hazards, have an interest in reporting employment discrimina-
tion. Because there are effective alternative enforcement opportunities,
fourth amendment rights need not bow to the urgent federal interest in
the employment discrimination area.
The result of Barlow's is laudable in that it halts, temporarily at
least, the Burger Court's erosion of fourth amendment rights.8 7 The
Court recognized that protection of privacy provided by administrative
probable cause is not counter-balanced by mere administrative conven-
ience or congressionally perceived urgency. In finding the Colonnade-
Biswell exception to the warrant requirement inapplicable, the Court
emphasized that consent to inspect, implied from a businessman's
awareness of significant government regulation of his business, is nec-
essary to support a warrantless inspection. In addition, although im-
plied consent is the primary factor in a Colonnade-Biswell analysis,
there should also be an inquiry into whether there are alternative en-
forcement opportunities available to government regulators. These two
factors provide a test to determine whether the Colonnade-Biswell ex-
ception is applicable to allow a warrantless regulatory inspection.
Thus, by examining both the level of implied consent and the availabil-
ity of alternative enforcement opportunities, a proper balance can be
pects of the business, such as rate-setting in the case of utilities. The Barlow's Court, however,
indicated that an industry-by-industry regulatory scheme is the type of regulation that would sup-
port implied consent, not a broadly sweeping regulatory scheme that includes all business con-
tracting with the government.
87. See, eg., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (holding that evidence seized uncon-
stitutionally, but in good faith, is admissible in federal civil tax proceeding); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (upholding warrantless search of automobile towed to police ga-
rage for parking violations); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (upholding warrantless
arrest of defendant seen on her front porch and arrested after having fled inside); United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (upholding warrantless arrest in public place despite sufficient time to
obtain warrant and finding defendant's consent to search automobile valid although made while
in custody); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (upholding warrantless search of exterior of
automobile seized from private lot after defendant's arrest); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973) (upholding warrantless search incident to arrest in which officer had sole discretion
whether arrest would be full custody); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (upholding
warrantless search of contents of cigarette pack as incident to full custody arrest); Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (upholding warrantless seizure based on uncorroborated information
from informant). But see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978) (decision, announced
week after Barlow's, holding newspaper's files subject to search pursuant to valid warrant al-
though paper in no way suspected of any illegality).
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struck between the individuars right to privacy and the public's interest
in regulation. By not opening the gates of all businesses engaged in
interstate commerce to government inspectors, but yet applying the
more lenient administrative probable cause standard, Barlow's will al-
low the Court to seek that proper balance.
H. BRYAN IVES, III
Constitutional Law-Rights of the Mentally Retarded:
Haderman v. Pennhurst Closes State Institution and
Mandates Community Care
Until the middle of this century the mentally retarded, neglected
by the medical profession, were routinely consigned for life to isolated
institutions.' During the last two decades, however, medical advances
regarding the capabilities and treatment of the retarded2 have spurred
judicial recognition of the rights of that institutionalized population.
Recent cases have held, principally on the basis of the eighth and four-
teenth amendments, that institutionalized retardates possess a right to
habilitation-the education, training, and care required by mentally re-
tarded individuals to reach their maximum development.'
This right to habilitation was first recognized and applied in Wyatt
v. Sticlney4 to mandate minimum standards of care and supervision
I. An excellent discussion of the historical treatment of the mentally retarded appears in
Mason & Menolascino, The Right to Treatment for Mental, Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal
and Scientjfe Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 124 (1976).
2. Id. at 136-43. A recent paper credits "mid-twentieth century discoveries (or redis-
coveries) of the capacities of disabled people, of teaching and learning techniques to evoke those
capacities and the more or less wide distribution of knowledge of those techniques among school
people and other service agents in our society." T. Gilhool & E. Sturtman, Integration of Severely
Handicapped Students: Toward Criteria for Implementing and Enforcing the Integration Impera-
tive of P.L. 94-142 and Section 504, at 7 (1978) (unpublished paper for Public Interest Law Center
of Philadelphia).
3. Habilitation is defined in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 395 app. (M.D. Ala. 1972),
as
the process by which the staff of the institution assists the resident to acquire and main-
tain those life skills which enable him to cope more effectively with the demands of his
own person and of his environment and to raise the level of his physical, mental, and
social efficiency. Habilitation includes but is not limited to programs of formal, struc-
tured education and treatment.
4. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971); 344 F. Supp. 373
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (right to treatment for mentally ill); 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (right to
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